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 ON- THE –JOB SEARCH, URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
– A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  : 
The inclusion of the urban informal sector in the analysis of economic development of a LDC is 
now a traditional culture in the discourse of development. Very recently, the urban informal 
sector has assumed immence importance in the process of international globalization. 
Development Economists care the urban informal sector due to its high labour absorbing 
potentials, low wage cost, forward and backward linkages to the urban formal sector. 
  There has been substantial theoretical models on the urban informal sector which includes 
the models of Fields (1987,1989), Quibria (1988), Dutta Choudhury (1989), Grinols (1991), 
Khan (1992 A, 1992b), Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1993, 1997), Lundborg (1990), Rauch 
(1991)etc. All the models walk on the Harries -Todaro (1970) track. Excepts Fields and Gupta, 
none of them considers open urban unemployment in migration equilibrium
4. 
  Most of the theoretical models show that the main source of labour in the urban informal 
sector is the migrants
5.  The interesting point  is that the migrants are also job-searchers.  They 
search for a job in the urban formal sector. The job search theory explains clearly why 
unemployment exists in the Urban sector despite the presence of the urban informal sector. 
People, migrating to the Urban sector, may remain unemployed for full time job search. It is 
assumed that full time job search is more efficient than part-time job search for getting high paid 
urban formal job. The idea of Job-search has been incorporated in the models of Fields (1975, 
1989), Majumder (1975), Steel(1978), Stark (1982) and cole and Sanders (1985). Most of the 
models explain job-search interms of the expected income from different Search strategy. Fields 
(1975) considers three types of job-search: Job search from the agricultural sector, job-search 
from the urban informal sector and full time job-search.  Fields (1989) also extends his earlier 
model to distinguish between ex-ante job search and ex-post employment. Stark (1982) explans 
job-search in a two period planning horizon where search technologies are not sector 
independent. Further, the literature on job-search also shows that ‘family and friends contact’ 
may reduce the job-search cost
7  
 
Another important concept in Job-search is the ‘graduation theory’. This theory states a strategy 
to stay in the urban informal sector and search part  time for high paid urban formal sector job. 
However, this theory fails if the urban formal sector directly recruits workers from the rural 
sector (see Majumder 1987) or if urban informal sector workers prefer self employment to the urban formal sector job. (see squire 1981 ) or if urban informal sector workers think urban 
informal sector job as permanent source of income (see Sethuraman, 1981). Moreover, most of 
the theoretical models on the graduation theory adopts partial equilibrium analysis. The partial 
equilibrium analysis can not touch many aspects, like supply-demand  imbalance in the analysis 
of  development of a LDC. So, a more general equilibrium analysis of job- search is desirable to 
highlight the efficacy of different Development policy in a LDC having strong urban informal 
sector. The present paper builds a job-search model in a general equilibrium framework by 
incorporating perfect and imperfect capital mobility. Like Fields (1989), the paper also considers 
a distinction between the ex-ante allocation of labour among different job-search strategies and 
the ex-post allocation of labour among different sectors. 
 
The paper shows that the more efficient on the job search from the rural sector the more will be 
urban unemployment rate, whereas the increase in the efficiency of on the job search from the 
urban informal sector lowers the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. This result is obtained 
in both the case of perfect and imperfect capital mobility. The first result contradicts the Fields 
(1989) proposition. 
We also find that urban formal sector enlargement affects ex-post and ex-ante employment in the 
Rural Sector even if the wage rate in the urban informal sector is constant. However, Fields 
(1989) has shown that urban formal sector enlargement does not affect rural wage rate, ex-post 
and ex-ante employment in the rural sector if the wage rage in the urban informal sector is 
invariant to this sector’s employment. Further, the paper also examines the effects of different 
fiscal Policies on the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment both in the case of perfect and 
imperfect capital mobility 
The model of imperfect capital  mobility is described in Section 2. This section covers the 
assumption, notations, equations, working of the model and the comparative static effects. The 
first model is extended in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to conclusions of the paper. 
2. THE  MODEL 
2.1 ASSUMPTIONS : 
The paper builds a three sector model of a small open economy. The three sectors are the 
urban formal sector, the urban informal sector and the rural sector. The products of all the 
three sectors are internationally traded
8. The assumption of small open economy gives 
constant product prices
9  in each sector. 
All the three sectors use both labour and capital as inputs. The production function of all the 
sectors are subject to the Law of constant return to scale and diminishing marginal productivity to each input. All the markets are competitive and in the long run equilibrium, 
product price is matched exactly by the unit cost of production in each sector. 
 
There are two types of capital : formal capital and informal capital. Informal capital is specific 
to the urban informal sector only
10 .  Formal  capital is mobile between the urban formal 
sector and the rural sector. Thus, we have a common rental on capital in the urban informal 
sector and the rural sector. The endowment of two types of capital are fixed and fully 
employed. However, the fixed amount of total labour force in the economy is not fully 
employed. 
It is assumed that each worker search  for urban formal sector jobs, perhaps, because of its 
highest paying potentials. I, like Fields (1989), consider three different job-search strategies. 
The first strategy describes full time jobs search as remaining unemployed at the beginning. 
We find this type of job search in Harris – Todaro (1970), Harberger (1971), Mincer (1976), 
Gramlich (1970), Stiglitz (1982) and Mcdonald and Solow (1985) and Fields (1989) . 
If a person, searching full time for urban formal sector jobs, becomes successful, he can earn 
high Urban formal wage with a specific probability of getting urban formal sector job, which 
is endogenous and earns zero, as unemployed if he becomes unsuccessful. 
The second strategy is to remain in the rural sector and search part time for urban formal 
sector jobs. In this strategy, the success gives high paid urban formal sector jobs, while failure 
means to remains in the rural sector and earn rural wage. 
The third strategy implies to search for urban formal sector jobs while working in the urban 
informal sector. It is assumed that job search from the urban informal sector is more efficient 
than the job-search from the rural sector because of the closeness of the urban informal sector 
to the urban formal sector. In this strategy, also success gives urban formal sector job and 
failure means to remain employed in the urban informal sector.  
Each search strategy has expected income. In equilibrium, the expected income from the three 
strategies would be equal. This is the basis of  allocation of labour force among three 
strategies . In the case of job-search, a person may get job in the sector where he does not stay 
at the beginning. Thus,  the number of ex-ante job searchers differs from the ex-post labour 
force. For this reason, Fields (1989) distinguishes between the ex-ante allocation of labour 
among different search strategies and the ex-post allocation of labour among different sectors. 
  The urban formal sector wage rate is institutionally given where as the two other wage 
ragtes are perfectly flexible
12 Urban unemployment exists in our stylized economy as people devote full time to search urban formal sector jobs and full time job-search is more efficient 
than part time job search. 
 
2.2 NOTATIONS 
j = u , r , i 
u = Urban formal sector 
r = Rural Sector. 
i = Urban informal sector. 
Xj = Level of out put in the j
th Sector. 
fj =  Intensive production function of the j
th sector. 
kj =  Capital-labour ratio in the j
th sector. 
Lj = Ex-ante amount of labour in the t
th job-search strategy ∀  t = 1, 2, 3. 
Pj = Effective price of the product produced in the j
th sector. 
cj = Unit cost of production in the j
th sector. 
Wu = Fixed urban formal wage rate. 
Wi = Urban informal wage rate. 
Wr = Rural wage rate. 
R = Rate of return on formal capital. 
Ri = Rate of return on informal capital. 
λ  = Probability of getting urban formal sector jobs. 
θ  = Efficiency on-the- job search in the rural sector. 
Ψ  = Efficiency on – the – job search in the urban informal sector. 
L = Total Labour endowment in the economy. 
Ki = Stock of informal capital in the economy. 
Kf = Stock of formal capital in the economy. 
U = Level of urban unemployment. 
β  = Employment augmenting parameter in the urban formal sector 






THE EQUATIONS : 
The intensive production functions of the three sectors are given by :  
Xu =   Lufu (ku)………………………….(1)  ; 
 X r =  Lrfr (kr)…………………………..(2)  ; and 
 X i =  Lifi(ki) …………………………..(3) 
Where f ′ j(.) >0 and f ′′ j (.) < 0 ∀ ….j = u, r, i. 
The longrun competitive equilibrium in the three sectors are given by the following equations : 
 P u =  Cu (Wu, R)……………………….(4) ; 
 P r =  Cr (Wr, R) ………………………..(5) ; and  
 P i =   Ci (Wi, Ri) ……………………….(6) 
The probability of getting urban formal sector job is :  
λ    =    Lu / (L1 + θ L2 + Ψ L3)                  ……………(7) 
Where (L1 + θ L2 + Ψ L3) in the total number of job seekers. 
The ex-ante allocation of labours among the different job-search strategy is made interms of 
expected income from search strategies. Thus, in equilibrium, the expected income from each 
search strategy will be equal and we get,  
  λ Wu = θλ  Wu + (1-θλ ) Wr  = Ψλ Wu + (1-Ψλ ) Wi ………………………………….(8) 
The number of people searching urban formal sector jobs from the rural sector is L2. Out of L2,  
θλ  L2 people get employment in the urban formal sector. Thus, the ex-post number of workers in 
the rural sector is :  
 L r = L2 (1- θλ )      ………………..  (9). 
Similarly, the ex-post number of workers in the urban informal sector is :   
      Li = Li (1-Ψλ )     ………………..  (10) 
The ex-ante and the ex-post endowments of labour are given by the following equations.  
 L 1 + L2 + L3 = L……………………………………………………(11) ; and  
 L u + Lr + Li + U = L…………………………………………………(12) 
The endowment equations for informal and formal capital are given by 
 k iLi = Ki  ……………………………………………….(13) ; and  
 k uLu + krLr = Kf………………………………………(14) 
The employment function for the urban formal sector is given by :  
 L u = h (Wu) + β  ……………………………………(15) 
 The domestic factor income of the economy is :  
 Y  =  WuLu + WrLr + WiLi + RiKi + RKf …………………..(16) 
Using equations (8) , (11) and (16) we get,  
 Y  =  λ WuL +RiKi + RKf ………………………………………(16.1) 
This set of equations carry the life story of the model. 
 
2.4 WORKING OF THE MODEL : 
  The model deals with sixteen endogenous variables ; Xu, Xr, Xi, Lu, Lr, Li, L1, L2, L3, Wr, 
Wi, R, Ri, λ , U, Y which are solved from equations (1-15) and (16.1). Given Wu and Pu, R can be 
obtained from  equation (4). Substituting the value of R into equation (5) we get Wr, given Pr. 
Now, given θ  and Ψ,  the expression (8) yields λ  and Wi. Once Wi is known, Ri is found from 
equation (6), given Pi. Since capital intensities are functions of wage-rental ratios, the equilibrium 
values of wage rates and rentals give the  optimum capital intensities: ku, kr and kI . Now, Li is 
obtained from equation (13), given Ki. Lu is obtained from equation 15, given Wu and β  . After 
substituting the equilibrium values of  ku, kr and Lu , one can get the equilibrium Lr, given Kf .  L2 
is known from equation (9) as Lr and λ  are already determined, given θ . Similarly, we get L3 from 
equation (10) as Li and λ  are known, given Ψ.  Equation (11) yields L1, given L2, L3 and L. 
Similarly, U is determined from equation (12) as Lu, Lr and Li are already obtained and L is given. 
Xu, Xr and Xi can be determined from the set of equations (1-3), since Lu, Lr, Li, ku, kr and ki are 
already known.  
Finally, one can get equilibrium Y from equation (16.1) as all factor prices and ex-post amount of 
labour are already known and Wu, Ki and Kf are given. 
This completes the entire determination of the model. 
 
 
2.5       COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS 
2.5.1 CHANGE  IN  θ :  
Suppose, on-the-job search efficiency from the rural sector increases. This raises θ . 
Assume, for simplicity, Ψ = 0.  The equation (8) becomes λ  Wu = θλ Wu +(1-θλ ) Wr = 
Wi…(8.1). If θ  rises, λ  and Wi go up, given Wu and Wr (see equation ..(8.1)). Equation (6) 
shows  that when Wi rises Ri falls , given Pi. Thus, ki rises and Li falls (see equation (13)). 
ku, kr remain unaffected, since Wr, R do not change with θ  and Wu, Pu and Pr are given. Given ku, kr and Lu, Lr also remains constant. The ex-post labour endowment equation 
(equation (12)) shows that as Li falls U rises, given Lu, Lr and L. 
The equilibrium rate of urban unemployment is U/(L-Lr). As U rises and Lr remains 
unchanged, U/(L-Lr) also rises. This result builds the following proposition : 
 
PROPOSITION 1 : The more efficient on the job search from the rural sector the more 
will be the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. Thus, the Field’s (1989) proposition 
is not valid in this case.  
 
2.5.2 CHANGE IN Ψ :  
If the job-search from the urban informal sector becomes more efficient, Ψ  increases. 
From equation (8) it is obvious that Wi falls if Ψ  rises, given Wr, λ.  When Wi falls, Ri 
rises, given Pi (see equation (6)). Thus ki falls and Li rises, given Ki (See equation (13)). 
Given Wu, Lu does not change and so also Lr, given ku and kr and kf. Given Pu, Pr and Wu, 
Wr and R remain invariant and thus, ku, kr remain fixed. 
So, U falls as Li rises with unchanged Lu & Lr. As L is given and Lr does not change, the 
ex-post urban labour force remains unchanged. Thus, the equilibrium rate of urban 
unemployment falls. This result builds the following proposition : 
 
PROPOSITION 2 : 
The more efficient on-the-job search form the urban informal sector, the lower will be the 
level of urban unemployment and so also the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. 
Thus, the Field’s (1989) proposition is valid in this case. 
 
2.5.3  CHANGE IN Pu : 
If output subsidy is given to the urban formal sector, Pu rises. The rise in Pu leads to a rise 
in R, given Wu . Again, given Pr, the rising R implies a falling Wr. Thus, both ku and kr 
fall. Now, equation (8) shows that a fall in Wr leads to a fall in λ , which again lowers Wi. 
Then, Ri rises given Pi. So, ki also falls and Li rises, given Ki. Equation (14) shows that 
given Kf and Lu, the falling ku and kr implies a rising Lr. Thus U falls. The equilibrium 
Rate of urban unemployment may also be written as 1-[(Lu + Li) / (L-Lr)]. As both Li & Lr 
rise and Lu remains unchanged, the fraction ( Lu +Li) / (L-Lr) rises and so the equilibrium 
rate of urban unemployment falls. This leads to the following proposition :  
PROPOSITION 3 : Subsidization to the urban formal sector lowers both the urban 
unemployment and the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. 
 
2.5.4 CHANGE IN Pr : 
  Subsidisation to the Rural sector raises Pr.  The increased Pr leads to a rise in Wr, given R. 
Thus, kr rises. ku and Lu do not change, given Pu, Wu and  β . So equation (14) shows that Lr falls. 
Now, a rise in Wr means a rise in λ  , given θ  and Wu, which inturn also raises Wi (see equation 
(8)). So, Ri falls given Pi. Thus ki rises and Li falls, given Ki. As both Li and Lr fall and Lu does 
not change, U rises. The ratio [(Lu + Li) / (L-Lr)] falls and so the equilibrium rate of urban 
unemployment rises. Thus we have the proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4 :- If subsidies are given to the rural sector, both the level of urban 
unemployment and the equilibrium Rate of urban unemployment rise. 
 
2.5.5. CHANGE IN Pi : 
Suppose output subsidy is given to the urban informal sector. This raises Pi, which, inturn, also 
raises Ri, given Wi. Here, Wi does not change because R, Wr and λ  remains invariant with a 
change in Pi. As Ri rises with given Wi, ki falls and so Li rises given Ki. ku, kr, Lu and Lr do not 
change. So, a rise in Li means a fall in U. This also implies a fall in the equilibrium rate of urban 
unemployment. So, we get the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 5 :  If the government. subsidises the urban informal sector, the level of urban 
unemployment and the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment fall. 
 
2.5.6 CHANGE IN β :  
If the government adopts any employment augmenting policy in the urban formal sector, β   rises. 
Equation (15) implies that Lu rises, given Wu. The rise in β  has no effect on R and Wr. So ku and 
kr do not change at all. So, Lr falls. Li does not change since β  has no connection with Li. 
Now, dLu = dβ  
And kudLu + krdLr = 0 
So, dLr =   - (ku /kr ) d β.  
    Thus, dLu + dLr = dβ  - (ku /kr ) dβ  = ( kr – ku )  dβ  < 0, 
                                                                 kr 
 
since kr < ku  ( assumed). Thus, (Lu + Lr) falls. So, U rises.  
The equilibrium rate of urban unemployment is  µ  =      U 
                        L – Lr 
 
dµ /  dβ   =        - 1 
             kr (L – Lr)
2         
dµ /  dβ   > 0   if krL < Kf  
 
Thus we have the following proposition : 
 
PROPOSITION 6 : An expansion of the Urban formal sector raises the  equilibrium rate of 
Urban unemployment if Lkr < Kf 
Fields (1989) has shown that the expansion of the urban formal sector has no impact on the wage 
rate, the number of ex-ante job searchers and the ex-post employment in  one sector if the wage 
rate in the other sector does not change with the level of  employment in that sector. In this 
model we find that Wi, Li and L3 do not change with β  The reason is as follows. Given Pu and 
Wu, R can not change and so also Wr, given Pr. The equation (13) shows that with Wu, Wr , θ  all 
constant, λ  remaining unchanged and so also Wi. Equation (6) implies a constant Ri, given Wi 
and Pi. Thus, Ki does not change and so also Li, given Ki. From equation (10) we find that L3 
does not change since Li, θ  and λ  remain the same. Thus, the UFS enlargement causes no change 
in the UIS . This result is obtained without the assumption that rural wage rate in invariant to the 
level of employment in the rural sector. The small country assumption is responsible for constant 
rural wage in this model. However if we assume constant Wi, then equation (13) shows that λ   
and  Wr  do not change, given θ,  ψ  and Wu. So, R also remains constant. This means, ku, kr do 
not change at all. On the other hand, Lu rises as  β  rises, given Wu. From equation (14) we find 
that Lr falls since Lu rises and ku, kr and kf are constant. Equation (9) shows that L2 will also fall 
since θ   and  λ   are constant and Lr falls. Thus, we do not get Field’s (1989) result if we assume 
constant wege rate for the UIS. 
 
[ krL – Kf – kuLi]  
PERFECT CAPITAL MOBILITY AND NON TRADED GOODS FOR THE UIS 
In this section the first model is extended with two directions. First capital is perfectly mobile 
among the three sectors. We find this type of capital mobility in Chandra and Khan(1993); 
second, UIS produces non- traded goods. 
 
3.1 THE EQUATIONS : 
  We assume perfect capital mobility among all the three sectors. Thus we have a common 
rental on capital. The material balance equation for Capital is given by :  
KuLu  + krLr + kiLi   = K ………………………………………(14.1) 
We also assume that the UIS produces non-traded goods whose price is determined by the 
demand-supply forces of the product. Let the demand for UIS product be Di = D(Pi), assuming 
income effect is nil. The market clearing for the UIS gives .  
 D(Pi)  = Xi  = Lifi (ki)………….(17) 
Equation (6) is modified as  Pi = Ci (Wi, R)………..(6.1) 
Equations (1)  - (12) , (15)  and (16.1) remain as they were in section 2. 
This model also satisfies the decomposable property. R , Wr, Wi, Pi and λ  are determined from 
equations (4)  - (7)  Changes in  factor endowments do not affect these five endogenous variables 
and so also the capital intensities. 
 
3.3  WORKING OF THE MODEL 
In this model Pi is no longer given. Equation (6.1) determines equilibrium Pi, given equilibrium 
Wi and equilibrium R. Wi and R are obtained like the first model. Li is determined from equation 
(17) after determining the equilibrium values of Pi and ki. All other endogenous variables are 
determined like the first model.  
 
3.4  COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS : 
3.4.1. CHANGE IN θ :  
ASSUME ψ  = 0. A rise in θ  raises λ  and Wi, since θ  does not enter in the determination of Wr, 
R. Higher Wi implies higher Pi, given R and thus lower D (Pi). On the other hand, as Wi rises and 
R remains constant, ki rises. Then from equation (17) we get lower Li following higher Pi and ki, 
Lu, ku and kr  do not change given Wu, R, Wr and ki rises, so (Li + Li) falls [(see equation (14.1)] 
From equation (12) it is obvious that U will rise. Again, ki rises and ku, kr remain the same. So, there is excess dd for capital. Following Rybczynski theorem, capital intensive sectors contracts 
and labour  intensive sector expands. Since capital intensive sector remains the same due to rigid 
UFS wage, the rural sector expands. Thus, the ex-post urban labour force i.e., (L – Lr)falls. 
Hence the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment rises. Thus we get the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 7 : 
A rise in the job-search efficiency from the rural sector raises both urban unemployment and the 
equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. 
The same result is obtained in the first model where informal sector uses sector specific capital. 
 
3.4.2 CHANGE IN ψ  
Consider θ  = 0 and ψ  is increased. Equation (8) becomes λ  Wu = Wr = ψ λ  Wu + (1- ψλ  )Wi.  Wr 
does not change since ψ  does not affect the determination of Wr. So λ  does not change, but Wr 
falls if ψ  rises. Given R, fall in Wi implies fall in Pi. So D(Pi) rises and Xi also rises. Falling Wi 
with constant R means lower ki, which implies higher Li to maintain equilibrium for the UIS. 
Now lower Ki and invariant Lu, Ku and Kr means higher (Lr + Li) and so U falls. Moreover as Ki 
falls and Ku, Kr do not change, there is excess supply of capital. This means capital intensive 
sector expands and labour intensive sector contracts. So Lr falls As a result export urban labour 
force rises. Hence, the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment falls. This bears to the following 
proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 8 : 
A rise in the job-search efficiency from the UIS lowers both the level and the rate of urban 
unemployment. 
The same result is obtained is the first model. 
 
3.4.3 CHANGE IN Pu : 
Subsidisation to the UFS raises Pu which raises R and lowers Wr (see equations (4)(5). From 
equations (8) it is found that lower Wr implies lower value of λ  and Wi, given Wu θ  and ψ  . As 
Wi falls and R rises, the net effect on Pi is indeterminate. So, the market clearing equation for the 
UIS implies that Li ,may more in any direction even if Ki falls. All the factor intensities Ki , Kr 
and Ki fall due to increased Pu. This has two implications : first, (Lu + Lr +Li) rises given K and 
thus, U falls; second, there is excess supply of capital. So the labour intensive contracts. That means Lr falls. Thus, U falls and the expost urban labour force (L-Lr) rises. This causes the 
equilibrium  rate of urban unemployment to fall. This result gives us the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 9 : 
Subsidisation to UFS lowers both the level and the rate of urban unemployment.  
The same result is obtained in the first model.  
 
3.4.4 CHANGE IN Pr : 
Suppose Pr is increased due to subsidization to the rural swector. This raises Wr, given R. The 
higher Wr means higher λ  and higher Wi. Thus, both Kr and Ki rise. A higher Wi with invarient R 
implies higher Pi, which means lower D(Pi). Since Ki rises, lower demand for the UIS product 
implies low Li. As Kr and Ki rise and Ku, does not change (Lu + Lr + Li) falls and so U rises. 
Further, as Kr and Ki rise and Ku is constant, there is excess demand for capital. This means, the 
labour intensive sector expands. So Lr rises and (L-Lr) falls. Thus, the equilibrium rate of urban 
unemployment rises. Hence, the proposition is : 
 
PROPOSITION 10  
A rise in Pr due to the subsidisation to the Rural sector raises both U and the equilibrium rate of 
urban unemployment. 
 
3.4. 5 CHANGE IN β  
Any employment augmenting programme in the UFS pertains to the same result what is obtained 
in the first model. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  : 
This paper examines the Fields ( 1989) preposition and the impact of different fiscal 
policies on the level and the rate of urban unemployment . We consider both the imperfect and the 
perfect capital mobility among the three sectors. Most surprisingly, we get the same results in 
both cases. 
We find that the Fields (1989) proposition is valid in the model of perfect and imperfect 
capital mobility if we consider on the –job search from the UIS. However, if job-search from the 
RS becomes more efficient urban unemployment rate rises in both cases. We analyse job-search in a more general framework which includes also the product 
market and the capital market. The comparative static results show that subsidisation to the UFS 
lowers both the level and the rate of urban unemployment in equilibrium. We get this effect both 
in the models of perfect and imperfect capital mobility. However, this is quite uncommon from 
the Harris-Todars  (1970) model where we find any urban development programme intensifies the 
problem of urban unemployment. On the other hand, the paper also shows that subsidization to 
the rural sector raises both urban unemployment and the rate of urban unemployment .  This also 
contradicts the Harris-Todars (1970) policy which states  that rural development is a solution to 
the problem of urban unemployment.  
The UFS enlargement raises the ex-ante and the ex-post employment in the rural sector 
even if the UIS wage rate remains constant. This contradicts the Fields (1989) result which states 
that the modern sector enlargement leaves the wage rate, ex-ante and ex-post employment in the 
RS unchanged if the urban traditional sector’s wage rate is invariable to the level of employment 
is this sector. We also find that the UFS enlargement may enhance both the level and the rate of 
urban unemployment in equilibrium We get the same result in the case of perfect and imperfect 
capital mobility. 
The present work re-examines the Fields (1989) proposition regarding the impact of job-
search efficiency and modern sector enlargement. Our treatment is somewhat more general than 
Fields (1989). First, we consider product market and capital market also along with the labour 
market, Secondly, we introduce perfect and imperfect capital mobility among the UFS, UIS and 
the RS; thirdly, UIS wage rate and RS wage rate are determined without asking any specific wage 
functions Moreover, to drive all the presuppositions of the model we have not assumed 
subsistence rural wage rate anywhere. However, Field’s (1989) assumed this to derive the relation 
between job-search efficiency and the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. Like Fields 
(1989), the present paper also assumes UFS employment as a function of wage rate in this sector 
and the UFS  employment is constant due to the institutionally given UFS wage rate. As a more 
general treatment we may introduce endogenous UFS wage  and re-examine  the Fields  (1989) 
result  once again. Further, like Fields (1989) the job-search efficiency is assumed to be constant. 
However, such efficiency may vary over time with the economic dynamism and educational level 




 FOOT NOTE 
* This is related to the Research work of the Author who is registered for Ph. D Degree in 
the University of Calcutta. 
1.  Fields (1989) has shown that the more efficient on-the job-search from the rural sector 
lowers the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. The same result in obtained when we 
consider job-search from the UIS. Fields (1989) has also shown that modern sector 
enlargement leaves the wage rate, the level of ex-ante and ex-post employment in one of 
the other sectors unchanged if the wage rate of the other sector is invariant to that sector’s 
employment. 
2.  We find perfect capital mobility in the CK (1993) model and imperfect capital mobility in 
the models of Grimols (1991) and M. R. Gupta (1997). However, in this model we   
consider imperfect capital mobility as assumed by Grinols (1991) 
3.  Fields (1989) has not considered product market. Thus, the question of effects of fiscal 
policy on the eqn rate of urban unemployment does not arise. 
4.  Fields (1989) explains urban unemployment in a framework where people remain 
unemployed for full time scareling for UFS jobs. Gupta(1993) explains urban 
unemployment interms of market clearing for the rural sector’s product whose price is 
fixed. 
5.  In reality we also find UIS without any migrants. Sec ………….. 
6.  Job-search efficiency, according to Fields’ (1989), depends upton two things : how much 
time is devoted to job-search and how close the job-searchers to the UFS. For this reason 
job-search from the UIS is more efficient than that of from the Rs. 
7.  Sec Banerjee and Kandur (1981, P.16) and fields (1975) 
8.  Grinds (1991), Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) assume that the UIS produces 
internationally traded goods. This assumption is not unrealistic. 
9.  Here, product prices are equal to the given international prices plus the rate of output 
subsidies given to the producers. 
10.  We find this is the Ginols (1991) model. 
11. Sec  Fields  (1989) 
12.  UFS wage rate is rigid due to effective wage legislation and unionisation of labour. Field, 
(1989) assume constant rural urge and UIS wage rate is equal to the average labour 
productivity in this sector. 
 
 References  
 
Bandyopadhyay , M. and M. R. Gupta, 1995a , “Development policies in the presence of an 
informal sector : A note” , Journal of economics, 61, 301 – 315. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, M. and M. R. Gupta, 1995b, “Capital mobility, informal sector and development 
policies : A dynamic analysis of a three-sector small open economy”, Working paper, Jadavpur 
University. 
 
Basu, K. C. , 1980 , “Optimal policies in a Dual Economy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
95,187-196. 
 
Beladi, H. and S. Marjit, 1992, “ Foreign Capital and protectionism”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 25, 233-238. 
 
Chandra, V. and M. A. khan, 1993,  “Foreign investment in the presence of informal sector” , 
Economica , 60, 79-103. 
 
Cole, W. E. and R. D. Sanders, 1985, “Internal  Migration and Urban employment in the Third 
World “, American Economic Review, 75, No. 3,481-494. 
    
Corden, W. M. and R. Findlay, 1975, “Urban unemployment, intersectoral capitalmobility and 
development policy”, Economica, 42, 59-78. 
 
Datta Chaudhuri, T., 1989, “A theoretical analysis of the informal sector” , World Development, 
187, 351-355. 
 
Datta Chaudhuri, T., and Smita Adhikari, 1993, “Free trade zones with HarrisTodaro 
unemployment : A note on Young-Miyagiwa”, Journal of Development Economics, 41, 157- 
162. 
 
Fields, G., 1975, “Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and underemployment and job 
search activity in LDCs” , Journal of Development Economics, 2, No. 2, 165-187. 
 
        ,    1989,  “on-the  –job  search  in  a  labour market model, ex-anti choices and ex-post 
outcomes”, Journal of Development Economics, 30, 159-178. 
 
Grinols, E. L., 1991, “Unemployment and foreign capital : the relative opportunity cost of 
domestic labour and welfare”, Economics, 57 : 107-121. 
 
Gupta, M. R., 1993, “Rural-Urban migration, informal sector and development policies : a 
theoretical analysis” , Journal of Development Economics, 41, 137-151. 
 
, 1994, “Duty-free zone, Unemployment and Welfare : A Note” , Journal of 
Economics, 59, No. 2, 217-236. 
 
, 1994, “Foreign    capital, income inequality and welfare in a Harris-Todaro model”, 
Journal of Development Economics, 45, 404-414.         
 , 1994, “duty-free zone in a Harris-Todaro Economy : A note” ,  Keio  Economics 
Studies , XXXI, 63-75. 
 
, 1995. “Tax on foreign capital income and wage subsidy to the urban sector in the 
Harris-Todaro model”, Journal of Development Economics, 47, 469-479. 
 
, 1997, “Informal sector and informal capital market in a small open less-
developed economy”, Journalof Development Economics, 52, 409-428. 
 
,  1997, “Foreign capital and the informal sector : Comments on Chandra and 
Khan” , Economica, 64, 353-363. 
 
,  1998, “Foreign Enclaves and Economic Development : A theoretical Analysis” , 
Journal of Economics, 67, 317-336. 
 
Hamada,  K.,  1974,  “  An    Economic  Analysis  of  the  Duty-free  Zone”  ,  Journal  of                        
International Economics, 4, 225-241.  
 
Hamilton, C. and L.O. Sevensson, 1982, “ On the Welfare Effects of a Duty Free Zone “ , Journal 
of International Economics , 13, 45-64. 
 
Harris , J. R. and M. P. Todaro, 1970, “Migration, Unemployment and Development  
: a Two-sector Analysis” , american Economic Revies, 60, 126-142. 
 
 
Jones , R. W., 1965, “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models” , Journal of Political 
Economy , 73, 551-572. 
 
 
, 1971, “ A Three-factor Model in Theory, Trade and History”, In Trade Balance of 




, and Easton, S. t., 1983, “Factor Intensities and Factor Substitution in General 
Equilibrium” , Journal of International Economics, 15, 65-69. 
 
 
Khan, M. A., 1980, “ The Harris-todaro Hypothesis and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Trade 
Model  : a synthesis” , Journal of International Economics, 10, 527-547. 
 
 
, 1982, “Tariffs, Foreign Capital and Immisering Growth with Urban 
Unemployment and Specific Factors of Produstion”, Journal of Development Economics, 
10, 245-265. 
 
 , 1992, “Trade and Developmentn in the Presence of an informal sector : A four-




,  and Naqvi , S. N. H., 1983, “Capital markets and urban unemployment” , Journal 
of Internatrional Economics, 15, 367-385. 
 
 
Lundborg, P., 1990,   “Rural-urban Migration and the Transition from Traditional to Modern 
Agriculture”,   Journal of Development Economics, 33, 287-207. 
 
 




Marjit, S., 1991, “Agro-based Industry and rural-Urban Migration : a case for an Urban 
Employment Subsidy” , Journal of Development Economics , 35, 393-398 
 
 
, 1990, “A Simple Production Model in Trade and its Applications”, Economic 
Letters, 32, 257-260. 
 
 
McCool,  T., 1982, “Wage Subsidies and Distortionary Taxes in a Mobile Capital Harris-Todaro 
Model” , Economics, 49, 69-79. 
 
 




Quibria, M. G., 1988, “Migration, Trade Unions and the Informal Sector : a note on Calvo” , 
International Economic Review, 29, 557-563. 
 
 
Rauch,  J.  E.,  1991,  “Modelling the Informal Sector Formally”, Journal of development 
economics, 35, 33047. 
 
 
Romatet Emmanual , 1983,   “Calcutta’s  Informal Sector : Theory and Reality” , EPW 18, 
December 10, 2115-2128. 
 
 
Sarkar, A. and M. ghosh, 1989, “A model of the informal sector” , I. S. I.  
Working Paper. 
 
 Sethuraman, S. V., 1981 (ed), “The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries : 
Employment, Poverty and Environment, ILO, Geneva. 
 
 




State Planning Board, 1990, “A Survey of the Informal Sector in CMA : A Perspective 




Stiglitz, J. E., 1976,  “The efficiency wage hypothesis, surplus labour and the distribution 
of labour in LDCs”, Oxford Economic Papers, 28. 
 
 
Weeks, J., 1975, “Policies for Expanding Employment in the Informal Urban Sector of 




                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 